Power the energy transition from the regions, and let the regions share the rewards

The debate about the UK's energy future is too often framed as a choice between pursuing the energy transition and keeping energy affordable. It is a false choice, because we need both, and both depend on a clear, consistent direction that investors and communities can plan around.
That is why the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan matters. For the first time, it will map the types and quantities of electricity and hydrogen generation and storage that the UK needs from 2030 to 2050, and the areas best suited to their development. Taken together with network planning, it gives us a chance to replace piecemeal development with a clearer, long-term approach.
A plan is only worth having, though, if there is the political commitment and the delivery capability to see it through.
Renewables are not a new experiment
Britain has been developing renewable energy for more than thirty years. Onshore wind has generated commercially here since the early 1990s, offshore wind since 2000 and utility-scale solar since 2011. These technologies carry decades of investment, innovation and industrial learning, and they are a long way from being a policy experiment we started yesterday.
Even so, whenever energy prices rise, some politicians suggest that reversing course will somehow bring cheaper power.
High energy costs do real damage. They weaken industrial competitiveness, squeeze businesses and put intolerable pressure on household budgets. Britain's electricity prices compare poorly with many of our European neighbours, and industrial prices are particularly worrying. We all agree on the problem, but we need to be honest about what is causing it.
Expensive electricity is not simply the result of the transition
The 2022 energy crisis showed how exposed we are when we depend on internationally traded fossil fuels. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the disruption to European gas supplies sent prices soaring, and Britain felt it even though only a small share of our gas imports had come from Russia. We did not need to rely heavily on Russian gas to be caught by the market shock.
More recently, the conflict involving Iran has shown again how quickly instability overseas feeds through into gas and electricity prices. Energy security and national security cannot be separated.
The relationship between gas and electricity prices sits at the centre of this debate. Gas-fired generation frequently sets the wholesale electricity price, because it supplies the marginal unit needed to meet demand. As a result, consumers can stay exposed to expensive gas even when much of their electricity comes from renewables.
That link is a design choice rather than a law of physics. Spain showed as much during the crisis, when it capped the price of gas used for power generation and broke the automatic pass-through for a time, preventing an estimated 30% increase in electricity bills for households on regulated tariffs. Our own Contracts for Difference scheme provides a different form of protection, limiting exposure to wholesale price spikes for the generation it covers.
Renewables are not free, and networks, storage, balancing, financing and policy support all carry costs that deserve proper scrutiny. Blaming the transition for rising electricity bills, however, hides the continuing influence of gas prices and the way our electricity market is designed.
CfDs are consumer protection, not a hidden tax
The Contracts for Difference scheme has become an easy political target, and I think it should be defended plainly.
CfDs work in both directions. When wholesale prices are low, generators are topped up, and when prices are high, generators pay the excess back. During the 2022/23 crisis, generators paid back well over £1 billion, which reduced the cost of the government's Energy Price Guarantee by around £18 per household.
CfD costs have fallen since the crisis began, from £32 to £27 per household per year, even though the scheme now supports more capacity. They make up less than 3% of a typical electricity bill, down from 5% before the crisis.
Any politician promising to scrap them should be asked what they would put in place of that consumer protection.
A practical transition needs more than one technology
Oil and gas should retain a role while we reduce our demand for them and build the infrastructure a cleaner economy needs. How we manage that existing industry, its workforce and its capabilities matters a great deal.
The Energy Profits Levy shows what happens when the rules keep moving. Introduced in 2022 as a temporary measure, it has been raised and extended several times. It is now due to end in March 2030, or earlier if its price-floor mechanism is triggered, and the government has published draft legislation for a permanent successor. Whatever view you take on the right level of tax, repeated changes have made long-term investment planning harder. The priority now should be a stable, predictable framework.
There is also clear public support for domestic production. In an Opinium survey of 2,000 UK adults, commissioned by OEUK in March 2026, 74% said the UK should produce as much of its own oil and gas as possible rather than rely on imports. A balanced mix of renewables and domestic oil and gas was the most popular option for energy security, chosen by 40%, compared with 26% who favoured renewables alone and 13% who favoured oil and gas alone.
That points towards a practical, mixed approach. It is not evidence that a majority wants every remaining North Sea reserve extracted regardless of cost or consequence.
We should also be careful not to promise that domestic extraction will shield consumers from international prices. North Sea oil and gas are traded on international markets, so while production supports jobs, economic activity and security of supply, it does not automatically bring cheaper energy for British households.
The task is to manage the resources and capabilities we already have while developing the ones that will underpin the next stage of our energy system. We should value energy security and stability more highly and the benefits that we can have directly from its production.
Floating offshore wind is a good example. Scotland is home to two of the world's pioneering floating projects, giving the UK 78MW of operational floating capacity and putting us third in the world behind Norway and France. The bigger prize is still ahead. Crown Estate Scotland estimates that ScotWind could enable £78.5bn of developer investment and identifies floating wind as the largest economic opportunity for Scotland. Several developers have committed to manufacturing floating foundations at Scottish ports. For the Highlands, this is an opportunity to secure lasting industrial investment and skilled employment.
Marine energy is another field where we already lead. The European Marine Energy Centre in Orkney, founded in 2003, is still the world's first and only accredited grid-connected open-sea facility for testing wave and tidal energy, and more marine energy technologies have been trialled there than anywhere else.
These advantages are real, but they will not last on their own. Experience has given us a strong platform, but we have to keep investing in and rewarding this innovation and take a long-term view in order to capture the long-term gains.
We are paying for a system that has not kept pace
One of the most frustrating features of the current system is that renewable electricity can be available while the network lacks the capacity to carry it where it is needed. When that happens, generators are paid to reduce their output and others are paid to generate elsewhere. That is a failure of coordination, because generation and transmission have not been built in step.
The answer is to speed up network delivery, improve connections and develop storage and flexibility alongside generation, rather than abandon the build-out.
Transmission charging makes the unfairness worse. Under the Transmission Network Use of System regime, generators pay more the further they are from the major centres of demand. According to Scottish Renewables, a project in the north of Scotland pays around £14 million a year, while an equivalent project in the south of England receives around £5 million. NESO forecasts for 2030/31 show that projects in the north of Scotland face £669 million in charges, while projects in England and Wales receive a net payment of £436 million.
This penalises generation in exactly the places where the wind and waves are strongest. Higher and more volatile charges push up the prices developers have to bid for contracts, and consumers end up paying for that. We are writing a spatial plan for a new energy system while keeping a charging regime designed for coal and gas plants near cities, and the two are pulling in opposite directions.
Communities that host the infrastructure that our energy security depends on should see a tangible benefit from it. Here in the Highlands, it is entirely reasonable to ask why living alongside so much renewable generation brings no obvious advantage on the household bill.
Reindustrialising our regions
For me, this is where the case for the transition is strongest.
The energy transition is the biggest opportunity in a generation to rebuild Britain's industrial base, and most of that opportunity lies a long way from London, in our ports, our coastal communities and our industrial heartlands.
In Scotland, that means the Highlands and the Cromarty Firth, the north-east around Aberdeen, Orkney and the Forth, where ports and industrial sites are well placed for offshore wind manufacturing, hydrogen and carbon capture. It means Teesside, the Humber, Merseyside, East Anglia, Belfast and the Celtic Sea.
These places have the deep-water ports, the engineering heritage and the skills that energy infrastructure needs. Many of them still carry the scars of deindustrialisation, and the transition can help reverse that, but only if we decide to make it happen.
That means making the turbines, foundations, cables and vessels here. It means skilled, well-paid jobs that allow young people to build a life in the communities they grew up in, along with rising household incomes, stronger local supply chains and better prospects for places that have too often been left behind.
None of this happens automatically. Building energy infrastructure in the UK does not guarantee that its components will be made here, or that the communities nearby will secure the best-paid work. That takes deliberate choices on skills, procurement, ports, investment and industrial capability, held steady over decades rather than reopened at every election.
Britain needs growth, and a great deal of it is waiting in the regions. We can become a manufacturing nation again and account for regional economic benefit when we make energy decisions.
Staying on the course is not blind loyalty
There is no single fix for Britain's energy costs, and nobody should promise that a clean energy system will automatically give us the cheapest electricity in the world. The realistic goal is stable prices and energy security, together with the jobs and regional wealth that come from making the most of the transition.
Getting there means scrutinising poor procurement, slow consenting, delayed connections and unfair charging. Scrutiny is different from changing course, though. Every change of direction adds risk and raises the cost of capital, and in the end that shows up on bills.
So the sensible question is what we should do now, given our natural resources, the investment already committed and the cost of the opportunities we have already missed.
Finish the system we have started and make it work better. That means building the networks, reforming transmission charging, backing floating wind, marine energy, storage and hydrogen, giving communities a real stake, and putting the reindustrialisation of our regions at the heart of national strategy. Deliver benefits through jobs, skills, life chances, prosperity - and growth.
The opportunities are clearly in front of us and we are already well down this road. Changing direction will only delay these opportunities and make the transition more expensive in the long-term.



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